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CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST, PLURALIST THEORY,
AND THE INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES
Thomas W. Merrill*

I. INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist is often viewed as the ultimate
"political" judge. According to Mark Tushnet, for example, "[o]ne
could account for perhaps ninety percent of Chief Justice Rehnquist' s
bottom-line results by looking, not at anything in the United States
Reports, but rather at the platforms of the Republican Party." 1 Nowhere
is this attitude more prevalent than with respect to issues of statutory
interpretation. When I informed colleagues I was working on an article
about Chief Justice Rehnquist's theory of statutory interpretation, the
almost universal response was: "What theory?"
Contrary to the common view that Chief Justice Rehnquist is
simply a "Republican Chief Justice," 2 especially in statutory
construction cases, I will argue here that his judicial performance largely
conforms to a coherent theory of law and politics. There is not a perfect
fit between theory and practice: it would be more than a little astonishing
if there were, given the practical constraints under which Justices labor,
including the need to respect (most) prior majority opinions and to
compromise (often) with colleagues in forging new majorities. Still, it is
my sense that Chief Justice Rehnquist is far more internally consistent
than most Supreme Court Justices, and that the best predictor of his
behavior is not the platforms of the Republican Party but an implicit
theory of the political system and of the proper role of the judiciary
within it.
The underlying theory animating Chief Justice Rehnquist may be
described as a species of pluralism. In common with other pluralists,
the Chief Justice perceives the political system as one in which
• John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. The comments of
Dean Robert Bennett and the research assistance of Robert Moye are greatly appreciated.
Financial support was provided by the Class of 1940 Research Professorship.
I. Mark V. Tushnet, A Republican Chief Justice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1328
(1990).
2. Id. at 1334.
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competing groups seek to advance private interests through bargaining
and compromise. 3 Within the universe of pluralism, however, there are
a number of divergent perspectives, and it is important to specify
exactly what kind of pluralist the Chief Justice is. Three factors in
particular differentiate his implicit pluralism from other varieties, such
as the pluralism embraced by modem public choice scholarship,4 or the
pluralist analysis of contemporary politics employed by republican
revival scholars.5 First, in contrast to most public choice scholars, Chief
Justice Rehnquist is generally optimistic rather than pessimistic about
the capacity of democratic institutions accurately to aggregate or sum
private interests to reach conclusions about proper policy. Second,
unlike republican revival theorists, Chief Justice Rehnquist tends to
view courts as an extension of the pluralist process, rather than as
institutions that function in a qualitatively different fashion than
legislatures or agencies. And third, unlike both public choice scholars
and the republican revivalists, Chief Justice Rehnquist is skeptical about
any claim to objective knowledge of the common good separate and
distinct from the outcomes reached through pluralist politics.
Once one understands the particular strain of pluralism that animates
Chief Justice Rehnquist, a number of prominent features of his judicial
record make more sense. Several commentators have observed that the
Chief Justice's opinions and voting record reflect a remarkably
consistent hierarchy of values. The earliest analysis along this line was
offered by David Shapiro in 1976. He argued that then-Justice
3 . Succinct discussions of the tenets of pluralism may be found in Kathleen M.
Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415, 1468-73 (1989); Cass
R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public lAw, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 32-34 (1985).
For a sophisticated exposition by a proponent, see ROBERT A. DAHL, PLURALIST
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: CONFLICT AND CONSENT (1968); ROBERT A. DAHL, A
PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC Ttil!oRY (1956); ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GoVERNS? DEMOCRACY
AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961).
4. A number of excellent surveys of the implications of public choice theory for
legal issues have been done, especially concerning the role of the courts. See DANIEL A.
FARBER & PHILIPP. FRICKEY, LAW AND PuBuc CHOICE (1991); Einer R. Elhauge, Does
Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YAU L.J. 31 (1991);
Jerry L. Mashaw, The Economics of Politics and the Understanding of Public lAw, 65 CHI.KENT L. REv. 123 (1989).
5 . I have in mind here scholars such as Cass Sunstein, who are influenced by
pluralism as a descriptive account of modem political reality, but who reject pluralism as a
normative model. See Sunstein, supra note 3. On the republican revival, see generally
Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 91 YAU L.J. 1493 ( 1988).
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Rehnquist tended to favor claims of order over liberty, claims of states
over the federal government, and claims of restriction over expansion of
the jurisdiction of federal courts. 6 Seven years later, Robert Riggs and
Thomas Proffitt published a study that confirmed a similar pattern using
a more statistical approach. 7 Most recently, Sue Davis concluded that
Chief Justice Rehnquist ranks "federalism in the highest position in his
hierarchy of values, with property rights in second place and individual
rights in the lowest position." 8 Although there are differences in
emphasis in these accounts, what is striking is the degree of consensus:
each of these observers agrees that the Chief Justice, relative to other
Justices, tends to place the rights of majorities ahead of the rights of
individuals; the rights of states ahead of those of the federal
government; and favors a restrictive view of the powers of federal
courts.
What is generally lacking from the hierarchy-of-values accounts is
any sense that Chief Justice Rehnquist' s commitments can be traced
back to a c<;>herent theory of politics. By and large, he is presented as
someone who just happens to have a particularly strong commitment to
federalism, a particularly weak commitment to individual rights, and a
particularly jaundiced view of federal courts. 9 In contrast, I will argue
6. David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV.
293, 294 (1976) [hereinafter Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist]; see also David L. Shapiro,
William Hubbs Rehnquist, in 5 THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND
MAJOR OPINIONS 109-45 (Leon Friedman ed., 1978) (summarizing and updating the
conclusions to 1978).
7. Robert E. Riggs & Thomas D. Proffitt, The Judicial Philosophy of Justice
Rehnquist, 16 AKRON L. REV. 555 (1983).
8. SUE DAVIS, JUSTICE REHNQUIST AND THE CONSTITUTION 32 (1989); see also Sue
Davis, Justice William H. Rehnquist, in THE BURGER COURT: POLITICAL & JUDICIAL
PROFILES 315, 334 (Charles M. Lamb & Stephen C. Halpern eds., 1991).
9 . Sue Davis's monograph is a partial exception to this statement. She argues that
Chief Justice Rehnquist's hierarchy of values stems from a philosophy of legal
positivism. DAVIS, supra note 8, at 21-24. She identifies this philosophy as having three
components: a democratic model of American government, id. at 24-26; moral relativism,
id. at 26-28; and a static approach to constitutional interpretation based on the text and
intentions of the framers, id. at 29-30. The combination of these three tenets leads
logically to a "minimal role for the judiciary." Id. at 30. I agree that there is a strong
strand of legal positivism in Chief Justice Rehnquist's jurisprudence. But I am not
persuaded that this is the ultimate source of his hierarchy of values. Legal positivism and a
minimal judicial role can explain Justice Rehnquist's tendency to put majoritarian values
ahead of individual liberties. But such a commitment to positivism does a poor job of
explaining Justice Rehnquist's attachment to States' rights relative to federal rights, and
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that once one understands Chief Justice Rehnquist's peculiar brand of
pluralism, each of his central value commitments falls into place.
In addition to explaining his enduring value commitments, Chief
Justice Rehnquist' s pluralism also has important implications for his
approach to statutory interpretation. Specifically, one would predict that
a pluralist of his stripe would adhere to four general interpretational
precepts. First, he would conceptualize the Court's task as being that of
the faithful agent of the enacting legislature, asking what a majority of
the legislature would have agreed upon if it had confronted the question
explicitly. Thus, he would adopt an originalist rather than a dynamic or
evolutionary model of interpretation; he would be an intentionalist rather
than a textualist; and he would freely refer to legislative history materials
insofar as they bear on reconstructing what the majority would have
wanted. Second, insofar as interpretational questions present choices
between conflicting social policies, he would tend to defer to decisions
made by electorally accountable interpreters such as executive branch
agencies. Third, in cases that implicate federalism values, he would
favor the use of canons of construction that would tilt interpretation
toward more localized decisionmaking. And fourth, he would give little
weight to claims of stare decisis in matters of statutory construction, at
least when such claims conflict with the result obtained using pluralist
interpretative techniques.
I will argue that Chief Justice Rehnquist's performance in statutory
construction cases generally conforms to the foregoing expectations
about the interpretative stance an optimistic pluralist of the type I have
described would adopt. Thus, the picture that emerges from the
statutory interpretation decisions reinforces the inferences to be drawn
from the hierarchy-of-values commentary: Chief Justice Rehnquist is a
highly principled jurist animated by a unique form of pluralist political
theory.

his tendency to cabin the jurisdiction of federal courts. With respect to both of these
commitments, commentators have observed that Chief Justice Rehnquist often distorts
legal positivist sources (statutes and precedents) in order to reach preferred outcomes. See
Jeff Powell, The Compleat Jeffersonian: Justice Rehnquist and Federalism, 91 YALE L.J.
1317 (1982); Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist, supra note 6. Moreover, even if all three of
his central commitments could be derived from legal positivism, this would only pose a
further question: what accounts for his commitment to legal positivism? I would submit
that the Chief Justice's attachment to positivism, like his other major value
commitments, can best be explained by his commitment to a particular form of pluralism.

1994]

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

625

I will conclude my remarks by contrasting Chief Justice
Rehnquist's pluralist approach to questions of legal interpretation with
that of Justice Scalia. As is well known, Justice Scalia has emerged in
recent years as the energetic champion of a textualist method of
statutory interpretation that looks to the language of the statute, related
statutes, and dictionary definitions, while vigorously rejecting the use of
legislative history. This method is very different from the faithful agent
style of interpretation favored by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
What is especially intriguing about the contrast between the
interpretative styles of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia is that
although Justice Scalia is much more explicit and insistent about his
commitments to a particular method of interpretation, it is more difficult
to discern a coherent theory of politics underlying Justice Scalia' s
writings than is the case with respect to the Chief Justice. The variable
that appears to be particularly uncertain or unresolved for Justice Scalia
is whether he thinks democratic institutions work well or poorly as
instruments of government. At one level, his textualism seems to
presuppose that legislative acts reflect a kind of imminent rationality. If
this is the motivating impulse behind his work, then Justice Scalia
would have to be seen as rejecting pluralist theory altogether. In other
respects, however, his textualism appears to reflect hostility to
legislative processes, and thus could be understood as a response
consistent with what a pessimistic pluralist of the public choice variety
might espouse. In any event, it is not clear whether Justice Scalia has
explicitly derived his legal method from an underlying theory of
government, or whether he and his supporters appreciate the deep
tensions between his approach and the theory of government that
animates the Chief Justice.

II. THE TAXONOMY OF PLURALISM
What does it mean to say that a person is a "pluralist"? A wide
variety of thinkers have been given this label, and the term is not used
with much precision. to Perhaps the key difficulty is the failure to
distinguish consistently between positive and normative deployment of
pluralist ideas. Quite a few theorists embrace pluralism as a model for
describing or understanding contemporary democratic institutions; a
10. See Henry S. Kariel, Pluralism, in 12 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OP THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 164 (David L. Sills ed., 1968).
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considerably smaller number endorse it as a basis for defining the
judicial role within the political system.
I will define pluralism inclusively to refer to any theory that accepts
as a descriptive matter that modem democratic politics is characterized
by the following features. First, that individuals and groups have
divergent interests and values that are largely exogenously determined,
in the sense that they are not much influenced by participation in the
political process. Second, that the central features of modem democratic
institutions, including periodic elections and majority voting, are
designed to aggregate or sum these private interests and values. And
third, that the aggregating or summing process will tend to produce a
public policy based on compromise that does not necessarily reflect a
coherent conception of the common good.
Within the universe of pluralist thought that accepts these descriptive
propositions, however, several important variations exist. These
variations, in tum, will have important implications for the normative
posture that any particular pluralist thinker will adopt. Of particular
relevance for present purposes are the implications for one's normative
conception of the role of the judiciary, both in constitutional cases and in
cases that involve questions of statutory interpretation.
One important variable concerns the degree to which a pluralist
believes that existing democratic institutions work well or poorly in
aggregating private interests. Some pluralists believe that the
competition for votes and the compromises needed to produce
legislation under a system of majority voting tends to produce a
reasonably accurate summation of private preferences-or at least will
do a better job of summing than any other governmental arrangement
known to exist. 11 I will call these optimistic pluralists.
Other pluralists, however, have strong reservations about the
capacity of democratic institutions to produce an accurate summing of
preferences. These pessimistic pluralists, including most modem public
choice theorists, 12 emphasize that different groups have different
11. 11,e early group theorists in the immediate postwar period fall into this category.
See WD..FRED E. BINKLEY & MALcoLM C. Moos, A GRAMMAR OF AMERICAN Pouncs (1949);
EARL LATHAM, THE GROUP BASIS OF POLITICS (1952); DAVID B. TRUMAN, THE
GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS: POLITICAL INTERESTS AND PUBLIC OPINION (1951). The early
works of Robert Dahl, listed supra note 3, also generally fit here. For a recent defense of
the optimistic assumption from an economic perspective, see Donald Wittman, Why
Democracies Produce Efficient Results, 91 J. PoL. EcoN. 1395 (1989).
12. Elhauge, supra note 4, at 35-44. Pessimism is especially pronounced among
thinkers associated with the Chicago school of economics. See, e.g., Fred S. McChesney,
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abilities to organize for political action, with the result that cohesive
minorities may exert more influence than diffuse majorities.13 In
addition, unless most legislators rank preferences in the same order,
whatever legislation gets enacted may be determined more by the ability
of key players to influence the sequence in which issues are considered,
or the committees to which they are assigned, rather than any conclusive
manifestation of majority will. 14 For these pessimists, therefore,
democratic institutions are not perceived as doing a particularly effective
job of summing private interests.
Although it exists at the level of positive analysis, the dichotomy
between optimistic and pessimistic pluralism has important normative
implications, especially for the judicial role. All other things being equal,
an optimistic pluralist is likely to endorse judicial restraint. ff one
believes the political system consists of compromises between
competing private interests, and that modem democratic institutions do
a fairly good job of summing these interests, then one is likely to
believe that courts should defer to the outcomes reached by these
institutions rather than impose their own views.
Pessimistic pluralists, on the other hand, are more likely to entertain
the possibility that judicial ordering will improve upon legislative
ordering. For example, scholars influenced by public choice theory are
likely to advocate greater use of market mechanisms rather than public
regulation as a method for summing individual or group interests. 15
Not surprisingly, therefore, some public choice-influenced scholars urge
an activist form of judicial review to minimize the scope of government
regulation. 16 Other pessimistic pluralists influenced by republican
Rent Extraction and Rent Creation in the Economic Theory of Regulation, 16 J. LEGAL
STUD. 101 (1987); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW
& EcoN. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J.
EcON. 3 (1971).

13. The literature on interest group influence on legislation is summarized in FARBER
& FRICKBY, supra note 4, at 12-37. Perhaps the most influential work in this genre is
MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLI.BCTIVI! ACTION: PuBuc GOODS AND nm THBoRY OF
GROUPS (1965).
14. See FARBER & FRICKBY, supra note 4, at 38-62. The key work here is Kl!NNlmf J.
ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL V ALUBS ( 1951 ). For a recent work stressing this
difficulty, see Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They," Not an "It": Legislative Intent
as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L RBv. L. & EcoN. 239 (1992).
15. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Modem Republicanism-Or the Flight from
Substance, 97 YALE L.J. 1633, 1640 (1988).
16. See generally RICHARD A. EPsTBIN, TAKINGS: PRlvATB PROPERTY & THE POWER OF
EMINENT DoMAIN (1985); STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NBW Rimrr v. THE CONsrrruTION (1986);
BERNARD H. Sll!OAN, EcoN0MIC LIBERTIES AND THE CoNsmunON (1980).
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revival theory advocate a more participatory and deliberative form of
democracy as an antidote to the perceived failings of pluralist
democracy. 17 In either event, the pessimistic pluralist is more apt to call
upon courts to take an active role in overturning or modifying the output
of democratic institutions.
A second important variable concerns whether the pluralist views
courts as being part of the process of pluralist politics or as somehow
separate and distinct from that process.IS Those whom I will call
judicial pluralists see the courts as simply another pluralist institution in
which judges act on exogenously-determined values and reach
outcomes based on bargaining and compromise. 19 Others, whom I will
call judicial deliberationists, see courts as being different from pluralist
institutions, and conceive of litigation as a process in which contested
policy issues are resolved in a nonpluralist fashion (such as collectively
deliberating about the common good).20
17. See, e.g., Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 91 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); Cass R.
Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 91 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988).
18. Cf Elhauge, supra note 4, at 67 (arguing that it is critical for public choice
theorists to develop a theory of comparative advantage that would explain why courts are
less susceptible to rent seeking and cycling than legislatures).
19. Two distinct groups appear to fall in this category. On the one hand, there are the
traditional political scientists who believe that the behavior of courts can best be
explained as a response to dominant public opinion, especially as reflected in overtly
majoritarian institutions such as the legislature. See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, DecisionMaking in a Democracy: The Role of the Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J.
PUB. L. 279 (1957); Thomas W. Merrill, A Modest Proposal for a Political Court, 17
HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 137 (1994) (citing additional authorities). On the other hand,
there are public choice scholars who have applied the insights of the Arrow Theorem, see
supra note 14, to decisionmaking by multi-member appellate courts. See, e.g., Frank H.
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802 (1982); Matthew L.
Spitzer, Multicriteria Choice Processes: an Application of Public Choice Theory to
Bakke, the FCC, and the Courts, 88 YALE L.J. 717 (1979). Starting from different
premises, both groups depict courts as "political'' institutions reaching decisions in ways
that do not differ qualitatively from the way decisions are reached by legislatures or
administrative agencies.
20. Interestingly, law-and-economics literature (the first cousin of public choice
theory) contains a version of what I have called judicial deliberationism. This is the
theory of the efficiency of the common law, which at least in its Posnerian incarnation
posits that common law courts produce efficient decisions because judges consciously or
unconsciously seek to reach utilitarian results. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE EcoNOMICS OF
JUSTICE 50-51 (2d ed. 1983). The most common form of the deliberationist view is found
in writing in the republican revival vein. See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, Political Markets

and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government
Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-78); Frank I. Michelman, Politics and Values, or
What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1979); Owen
Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
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Again, it is not difficult to see how one's position on judicial
pluralism versus judicial deliberationism would translate into different
attitudes about the judicial role. For the judicial pluralist, having an
activist judiciary simply entails substituting one pluralist process for
another pluralist process. Instead of having private groups compete for
advantage through elections and legislative lobbying, now they compete
by funding litigation and seeking to influence the judicial selection and
confirmation processes.2 1 Since the judicial pluralist sees little reason
why the collective action problems in litigation are less significant than
those in the legislative process,22 and little reason to believe that multimember appellate courts are less susceptible to cycling and agenda
manipulation than legislatures,23 such a pluralist is unlikely to prefer
judicial policymaking to legislative and executive policymaking. In
contrast, the judicial deliberationist is more apt to endorse judicial
activism, since for such a theorist transferring the focus of decisional
authority from democratic institutions to courts promises an escape
from the collective action and incoherence problems associated with
ordinary pluralist politics.
A third important distinction among pluralists (existing directly at
the normative level) is whether there is a meaningful concept of the
common good separate and distinct from the sum of individual
preferences generated by the pluralist political process. Some pluralists,
whom I will call moral skeptics, think that it is not meaningful to speak
of such a common good. For these theorists, any statement about the
common good reduces to a statement about the speaker's personal
tastes and preferences.24 Other pluralists, who I will call moral realists,
believe there is an independent and discernible common good.25 Such a
pluralist is quite willing to criticize the outcomes reached by the political
process insofar as they deviate from the outcomes that would be

21. See, e.g., Panel Discussion, The Role of Interest Groups in the Appointment
Process, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 933-82 (1990).
22. See Elhauge, supra note 4, at 66-87.
23. Id. at 101-09; Easterbrook, supra note 19.
24. Justice Holmes is a well-known legal figure who often seemed to embrace this
kind of skepticism. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting). Judge Learned Hand is another. See infra note 68.
25. I use "realism" here in the philosophical sense (as in "metaphysical realism"),
not the legal realist sense. See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretative Turn in Modern
Theory: A Tum for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 (1989).
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generated by a consistent application of the theorist's concept of the
common good. 26
Once again, where one falls on the moral skepticism versus moral
realism spectrum will have important implications for one's concept of
the proper judicial role. As Einer Elhauge has persuasively argued, one
"cannot apply interest group theory to condemn the political process
without some independent normative baseline."27 Thus, skeptical
pluralists-those who deny the reality of any such independent
normative baseline-will be more inclined to advocate judicial restraint
If there is no meaningful concept of the common good separate and
distinct from pluralist bargaining, then there is little basis for believing
that society will be better off if it is governed by courts rather than
legislatures. On the other hand, moral realists-those convinced of the
reality of some normative baseline such as efficiency or equality28-are
more apt to view the courts as positive instruments of reform. All the
moral realist has to do is convince the courts to accept his vision of the
common good, and convince them that they have the power to act to
implement that vision, and society will be better off than if governed by
pluralist compromises.
Obviously, there is considerable interdependence among the
foregoing three variables. For example, a moral realist who holds to an
objective theory of the common good will more likely be pessimistic
about the outcomes of existing democratic institutions than a moral
skeptic. The moral realist will have a clear benchmark against which to
measure the performance of democratic institutions, and for that reason
alone will be more likely to find that performance wanting.
Nevertheless, I do not believe that any of these factors logically
entails any other. For example, a moral realist who is a majoritarianthat is, one who believes that the wishes of the majority defines the
common good-could be either an optimist or a pessimist about the
26. Richard Epstein provides an example of this position from the political right,
urging judicial intervention to promote a nonn of wealth maximization. See Epstein,
supra note 15. Cass Sunstein provides an example from the political left, urging the use of
canons of constructions designed to promote redistributive ends. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
AFTER nm RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1990).
2 7. Elhauge, supra note 4, at 58.
2 8. Elhauge mentions four ''nonnative baselines" that have been adopted by pluralist
thinkers: majoritarianism (measuring outcomes by the number of persons who approve);
wealth maximization (measuring outcomes by total dollars of societal wealth); utility
maximization (measuring outcomes by total utility); and distributive justice (measuring
outcomes by whether they bring us closer to an equitable distribution). Id. at 58-59.
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capacity of existing institutions to realize the will of a majority, and
could conceive of the courts as being either pluralist or deliberative
institutions. 29
The different strands of pluralist thought also suggest that there is an
ideal typical pluralist who would be maximally inclined toward a
modest federal judicial role. This pluralist would be optimistic about the
interest-summing powers of the electoral branches, pessimistic about
the ability of courts to transcend pluralist politics, and skeptical about the
possibility of an objective understanding of the common good. Such a
thinker could be called an ultrapluralist. On the other hand, one can also
imagine an ideal typical pluralist who would be maximally inclined
toward an expansive federal judicial role. This pluralist would be
pessimistic about the functioning of democratic institutions, would
believe that courts are nonpluralist, and would embrace an objective
theory of the common good. 30 Virtually all judges and legal theorists
probably fall somewhere between these two extremes, or adopt one set
of assumptions for one type of issue and other assumptions for other
issues. Occasionally, however, one encounters the pure type.

m. CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST As AN ULTRAPLURALIST
Chief Justice Rehnquist is a pluralist, as I have defined the term. 31
Indeed, he appears to conform very closely to what I have described as
the ideal typical pluralist most likely to endorse a modest federal judicial
role: an ultrapluralist. That is to say, Chief Justice Rehnquist is
optimistic about the interest-summing capacities of legislatures, tends to
29. James Madison provides a further illustration of the ways in which these
variables can be mixed and matched in different combinations. Madison worried that
democratic legislatures would be dominated by factions, and criticized this prospect based
on his own ideas of the common good. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 10, 44 (James
Madison). But he also opposed judicial review as a solution, preferring instead to try to
devise a structure of government that would minimize the dangers of factions. See Thomas
W. Merrill, Zero-Sum Madison, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1392 (1992). Thus, Madison might be
described as a pessimistic pluralist who was a moral realist but a judicial pluralist rather
than a judicial deliberationist.
30. Since this ideal type does not play a major role in the ensuing analysis, I do not
need a name for it. If one were needed, perhaps it could be called Lochnerian pluralism,
since the substantive due process jurisprudence of the Lochner Court appears to
presuppose these features.
31 . I am not the first to have made the connection between Rehnquist and pluralist
theory, see Stephen A, Gardbaum, Why the Uberal State Can Promote Moral Ideals After
All, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1350, 1359 n.42 (1991), but I am not aware of the point being
developed in the literature.
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view the judiciary as just another pluralist institution, and is a moral
skeptic.
The evidence supporting these assertions includes Chief Justice
Rehnquist' s extrajudicial writings and inferences that can be drawn
from specific positions he has taken while a sitting Supreme Court
Justice. 32 Perhaps the best evidence of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
ultrapluralism, however, consists of the hierarchy of values reflected in
his overall voting record-the preference for order over liberty, for local
authority over federal authority, and for a constrained rather than an
expansive view of federal court jurisdiction. I shall argue that these basic
commitments are all consistent with ultrapluralism. Of course, the fact
that an ultrapluralist could embrace these value commitments does not
necessarily mean that Chief Justice Rehnquist is motivated by such a
philosophy. But taken together with the evidence from his extrajudicial
writings and his positions on discrete issues, a fairly convincing case
can be made that his performance is grounded in an implicit pluralist
political theory of the type I have described.

A Evidence from Extrajudicial Writings and Judicial Positions
In considering the evidence from Chief Justice Rehnquist's
extrajudicial writings and positions on specific issues, I will begin with
his moral skepticism, where the evidence is especially strong. Chief
Justice Rehnquist' s extrajudicial writings contain some very explicit
statements of skepticism about the possibility of an objective theory of
the common good. Perhaps the best known is a passage from an article
entitled The Notion of a Living Constitution, 33 where he states explicitly
that moral judgments are statements of subjective preference that cannot
be proven or disproven through any logical demonstration:
32. Although Chief Justice Rehnquist received two masters degrees in political
science in the late 1940s (one from Stanford and one from Harvard), I was unable to
discover any evidence that might suggest he was influenced directly by early optimistic
group theorists who were beginning to be active at that time. See supra note 11. The
masters thesis he wrote at Stanford is available at that school's library. William H.
Rehnquist, Contemporary Theories of Rights (1948) (unpublished M. Pol. Sci. thesis,
Stanford University) (copy on file with author). Although this thesis deals with political
philosophy and theories of rights, it does not cite any of the group theorists. It is unclear
whether Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a thesis while at Harvard; if he did, it is no longer
available at the school's library.
33. William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Uving Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REv.
693, 704 (1976). But see William W. Justice, A Relativistic Constitution, 52 COLO. L.
REV. 19 (1980) (criticizing the moral relativism of the Texas article).
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Beyond the Constitution and the laws in our society, there simply is
no basis other than the individual conscience of the citizen that may
serve as a platform for the launching of moral judgments. There is no
conceivable way in which I can logically demonstrate to you that the
judgments of my conscience are superior to the judgments of your
conscience, and vice versa. Many of us necessarily feel strongly and
deeply about our own moral judgments, but they remain onz personal
moral judgments until in some way given the sanction of law. 3

Chief Justice Rehnquist went on to clarify that he did not mean to say
"that individual moral judgments ought not to afford a springboard for
action in society, for indeed they are without doubt the most common
and most powerful wellsprings for action when one believes that
questions of right and wrong are involved."35 Rather, his point was that
the only way to choose between moral judgments in a democratic
society is to take a vote, and adhere to the judgment endorsed by a
majority. 36
·
Chief Justice Rehnquist has drawn a similar conclusion in writing
about the Bill of Rights. The only reason the Bill of Rights trumps
ordinary legislation, he believes, is because it reflects the will of a
supermajority rather than an ordinary majority.3 7 Accordingly, there
would be nothing illegal, immoral, or improper about a decision by a
future supermajority to repeal the entire Bill of Rights.38
Further evidence that Chief Justice Rehnquist is a skeptic about
theories of the common good is provided by his positions on specific
34. Rehnquist, supra note 33, at 704.
35. Id. at 705.
36. Id.
37. William H. Rehnquist, Government

by Cliche, 45 Mo. L. REV. 379, 390-92
(1980).
3 8. Id. This skepticism about the possibility of an objective concept of the common
good is not a recently acquired element of Chief Justice Rehnquist's thinking. His masters
thesis, written nearly 30 years earlier at Stanford, see supra note 32, also contains strong
statements of value skepticism. For example, he relies upon the subjectivity of values in
support of the proposition that the state should remain neutral as between competing
conceptions of the good:
The fact that the ultimate, and only reliable, source of value judgments is in
individuals themselves indicates that the highest moral purpose the state can
fulfill is not to adopt or impose any arbitrary theory of morality, but to be itself
amoral. To put this another way, the highest end which the state can serve is to
serve no end at all, but merely exist as a means for the individuals within it to
realiz.e their own ends.
Rehnquist, supra note 32, at 73.
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issues that have come before the Court. 39 In equal protection cases, for
example, he has demonstrated considerable impatience with the
requirement that a classification must be shown to have a "legitimate"
purpose. He has come close to suggesting that the very fact that a
majority of the legislature voted to adopt a classification is sufficient to
establish that it has a legitimate end.40 This of course is exactly the
position one would expect a moral skeptic to take. If the only arbiter of
the public good is the vote of a majority, then a majority vote should be
both necessary and sufficient to establish that an action is "good."
The second element in Chief Justice Rehnquist's pluralist
philosophy-his belief that courts are just another form of pluralist
institution-is visible in his stewardship of the Supreme Court as its
Chief Justice. For example, as Chief Justice he has significantly cut
down on the amount of time the Court spends in collective deliberation
in conference. 41 His book on the.Supreme Court supplies the reason: "I
do not think that conference discussion changes many votes. " 42 The
book's reflections on the role of the conference is most revealing in this
light:
Probably every new justice, and very likely some justices who have
been there for a while, wish that on occasion the floor could be opened
up to a free-swinging exchange of views with much give-and-take rather
than a structured statement of nine positions .... [But e)ach of us soon
comes to know the general outlook of his eight colleagues, and on
occasion I am sure that each of us feels, listening to the eight others, that
he has "heard it all before." If there were a real prospect that extended
discussion would bring about crucial changes in position on the part of
one or more members of the Court, there would be a strong argument for
3 9. Sue Davis has reviewed Chief Justice Rehnquist' s opinions in individual rights
cases and concluded he is a moral relativist. See DA VIS, supra note 8, at 26-28.
40. In the most notorious of these opinions, the Chief Justice said: "[W]here ...
there are plausible reasons for Congress' action our inquiry is at an end .... [T]his Court
has never insisted that a legislative body articulate its reasons for enacting a statute."
United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980); see also United
States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 546 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murray, 413 U.S. 508, 523 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 549 (1972).
41 . The most dramatic change here is in what used to be called the "long conference,"
held in the fmal week of September to dispose of certiorari petitions that have accumulated
over the summer recess before the start of a new Tenn. Under Chief Justice Burger, the
September conference lasted five days. Chief Justice Rehnquist cut it down to two days.
See DAYID G. SAVAGE, TuRNING RIGHT: TuB MAKING OF nm REHNQUIST SUPRBMB COURT 53
(1992).
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having that sort of discussion even with its attendant consumption of
time. But my sixteen years on the Court have convinced me that the true
purpose of the conference discussion of argued cases is not to persuade
one's colleagues through impassioned advocacy to alter their views, but
instead by hearing each justice express his own views to determine
therefrom the view of the majority of the Court.43

This sort of attitude, of course, carries with it a kind of self-fulfilling
prophecy. Chief Justice Rehnquist is convinced that most minds are
made up before conference and hence there is little point in an exchange
of views. But truncating the discussion only increases the odds that no
one will change their mind. In any event, it is significant that the Chief
Justice views the process of collective decisionmaking by the
conference in the same pluralist terms commonly used to describe
voting in the legislature.
There are other, more subtle ways in which judicial pluralism is
revealed by Chief Justice Rehnquist' s attitude as a judicial administrator.
For example, he defends the practice of sending •~oin" memoranda to
the author of a proposed majority opinion before waiting to read the
dissent.44 In a pluralist world where individuals make up their minds
based on exogenous preferences this makes perfect sense; in a world
where individuals engage in collective deliberation and have their beliefs
and values shaped by dialogue it does not. Justice Rehnquist also
confirms that he imposes very short deadlines-"ten days or two
weeks"-on his clerks in preparing draft opinions.45 Clearly, he regards
the thoroughness and persuasiveness of an opinion as less important
than making sure the trains run on time. Again, the implicit judgment is
that other Justices are not likely to be influenced by the legal arguments
set forth in a draft opinion, since their minds are already made up.
Chief Justice Rehnquist' s judicial pluralism is also evident in his
published statements about the sources of influence on Supreme Court
decisions. One gets very little sense in these writings that the Chief
Justice sees the law as a significant force in shaping the views of the
Justices. Instead, he has frankly acknowledged that the Court is
influenced by public opinion. Public opinion, he has indicated, shapes
the views of the Justices directly, through their contacts with the wider
42. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT, How IT WAS, How IT Is 292

(1987).
43. Id. at 294-95.
44. Id. at 303.
45. Id. at 298.
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society. 46 He has suggested that this is desirable, because if a Justice
attempted to isolate himself from public opinion, the consequence
would be that he would only be "influenced by the state of public
opinion at the time he came to the bench. "47
Public opinion also influences the Court through Presidential
appointments. Chief Justice Rehnquist has written approvingly of
Presidential efforts to "pack" the Court with individuals "who are
sympathetic to his political or philosophical principles. " 4 8 As he
explained:
[T]he manifold provisions of the Constitution with which judges must
deal are by no means crystal clear in their import, and reasonable minds
may differ as to which interpretation is proper. When a vacancy occurs on
the Court, it is entirely appropriate that that vacancy be filled by the
President, responsible to a national constituency, as advised by the
Senate, whose members are responsible to regional constituencies. Thus,
public opinion has some say in who shall become Justices of the
Supreme Court.49

Chief Justice Rehnquist evidently believes both that Supreme Court
decisions are the product of the personal values and attitudes of the
Justices, and that public policy should be fixed on the basis of the values
of attitudes of the majority. Consistent with these views, he regards it as
a good thing that some mechanism exists, however imperfect, for
keeping the values and attitudes of the Justices in line with dominant
public opinion.
The third element in Chief Justice Rehnquist' s pluralism-his
optimistic assessment of the capacity of democratic institutions to
engage in interest-summing-finds less direct support in his
extrajudicial writings. However, the very absence of any discussion of
the possible failings of democratic processes is itself significant.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist has acknowledged that majorities can
and do oppress minorities, 50 the possibility that minorities might be
able to exploit democratic institutions to oppress majorities seems not to
have occurred to him. In other words, Chief Justice Rehnquist is largely
46. William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 751 (1986).
4 7. Id. at 768-69.
48. William H. Rehnquist, Presidential Appointments to the Supreme Court, 2
CONST. COMMENTARY 319 (1985).
49. Id. at 320.
50. Rehnquist, supra note 32, at 55-56.
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oblivious of the insights of modem public choice theory. He
consistently equates "majority rule" with "the will of the people,"51 and
does not stop to consider the possibility that the relationship between the
two may be problematic.
Chief Justice Rehnquist' s position on issues that have come before
the Court also provides inferential support for the proposition that he is
an optimistic pluralist. He consistently urges judges to defer to
legislatures where the legislature has resolved a contested policy
question. As Sue Davis notes, "His persistent advocacy of a deferential
standard of review for classifications based on gender, illegitimacy, and
alienage presents a very clear example of his commitment to the
democratic model. "5 2 But this position is not simply a reflection of a
Thayerian belief that courts should defer to legislatures on all issues of
"reasonable doubt."53 In circumstances where Chief Justice Rehnquist
perceives that Congress has failed to resolve a contested policy question,
he has argued that legislation should be declared unconstitutional under
the nondelegation doctrine.54 Such a result would in effect "remand"
the issue to Congress to make an explicit choice. The idea that
nondelegation doctrine prohibits Congress from ducking controversial
policy questions has no clear foundation in the text of the
Constitution. 55 Thus, under Thayer's conception of the judicial role,
there would be no more basis for enforcing the nondelegation doctrine
than for invalidating classifications based on gender or illegitimacy.
Once Chief Justice Rehnquist is seen to be an ultrapluralist,
however, there is no inconsistency between his deference to legislative
judgments where it has resolved contested policy questions and his
51. See, e.g., Rehnquist, supra note 37, at 392.
52. See DAVIS, supra note 8, at 63.
53. James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional uiw, 1 HARV. L. REv. 129 (1893). See generally Symposium, One Hundred
Years of Judicial Review: The Thayer Centennial Symposium, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1993)
(discussing different dimensions and implications of Thayer's theory of judicial review).
54. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 671 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
5 5. It is true that the Constitution creates three branches of government, and vests
"all Legislative Powers herein granted" to the Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. But the
Constitution does not prohibit Congress from enacting statutes that duck serious policy
questions by granting enforcement authority to executive agencies (or courts) in broadlyworded or ambiguous terms. The nondelegation doctrine posits that a line can be drawn
between permissibly and impermissibly vague grants of enforcement authority, a line the
Court has never succeeded in defining. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Constitutional
Principle of Separation of Powers, 1991 SUP. CT. REv. 246-47.
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refusal to defer in cases where the legislature has failed to resolve such
questions. Both positions are consistent with a belief that the best
institutions to resolve conflicting policy questions are democratic
legislatures. It is precisely because of his faith in the efficacy of pluralist
summing by legislatures that Chief Justice Rehnquist would force
legislatures to make controversial decisions rather than allow them to be
determined by agencies or courts.
B. The Hierarchy of Values

Perhaps even more telling evidence of Chief Justice Rehnquist's
ultrapluralist philosophy is provided by the hierarchy of values other
commentators have perceived in his judicial record. I will take the
following propositions about Chief Justice Rehnquist' s value
commitments to be established:56 (1) he prefers claims of order over
claims of liberty or individual right; (2) he prefers claims of state and
local governments over claims of federal authority; and (3) he prefers to
restrict the jurisdiction and powers of the federal courts. Each of these
value commitments is consistent with the ultrapluralist philosophy I
have described.
Consider first his preference for order over liberty. This is exactly
what one would expect from pluralist who is optimistic about the
capacities of democratic institutions to aggregate disparate private
interests, who regards the judiciary as just another pluralist institution,
and who is skeptical about theories of an objective common good.
Claims for order tend to be majoritarian. They are typically embodied in
legislation or in administrative action taken by actors accountable to an
elected executive. Claims for liberty, in contrast, tend to be advanced by
dissenting minorities seeking judicial protection. Given that Chief
Justice Rehnquist believes that democratic institutions accurately sum
individual preferences, it makes sense that he should prefer majoritarian
outcomes: they are more likely to reflect an accurate weighing of
majority and minority interests than any other outcome. This impulse is
reinforced by the proclivity of partisans of liberty to frame arguments in
terms of theories of natural right that Chief Justice Rehnquist finds
lacking in any objective foundation. Finally, since he views the judicial
process as an extension of pluralist politics, judicial endorsement of
S6. This consensus view of Chief Justice Rehnquist's hierarchy of values is distilled
from Shapiro, Riggs and Proffitt, and Davis. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
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claims of liberty simply involves replacing one pluralist outcome with
another, less reliable, pluralist outcome.
Chief Justice Rehnquist' s consistent preference for claims of state
and local governments over claims of federal authority57 also can be
derived from ultrapluralism. Although an optimistic pluralist believes
that democratic institutions generally reach results that reflect the
greatest good of the greatest number, such a process always generates
pools of winners and losers. One of the strengths of federalism (or of
decentralized decisionmaking in any form) is that in a world governed
by majoritarian decisionmaking, the greater the number of jurisdictions
into which pools of competing groups are divided, the larger the net
sum of winners over losers will be. 58
The point can be demonstrated by illustration. Suppose there is a
single political jurisdiction, and within that jurisdiction one group of
individuals wants to permit smoking in public places, and another group
wants to prohibit it. If there are 110 smokers and ninety nonsmokers,
then the smokers will prevail and there will be a rule permitting
smoking. The net sum of winners over losers is twenty. Now suppose
that the same two hundred citizens are divided into two jurisdictions,
each containing one hundred citizens. It is possible that each jurisdiction
will contain fifty-five smokers and forty-five nonsmokers, and the same
net sum of winners over losers will result. But if the distribution of
preferences is skewed in any way between the two jurisdictions, the net
sum of winners over losers will increase. For example, if Jurisdiction A
has sixty-five smokers and thirty-five nonsmokers, and Jurisdiction B
has forty-five smokers and fifty-five nonsmokers, then A will permit
smoking and B will prohibit smoking. The total number of winners will
now be sixty-five plus fifty-five, or 120, and the total number of losers
thirty-five plus forty-five, or eighty. The net sum of winners over losers
is now forty.
57. As Sue Davis has written: "Rehnquist seems to assume that small units of
government, those closest to the people, will most likely reflect the will of the majority.
Thus, state laws, which most closely resemble the ideal of the democratic model, are to be
highly valued." DAVIS, supra note 8, at 34. For further documentation of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's strong preference for state and local solutions, see Powell, supra note 9.
58. See ALBERT BRETON, THE EcoNOMIC THEoRY OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
114 (1974); Bhajan S. Grewal, Economic Criteria for the Assignment of Functions in a
Federal System, in ADVISORY COUNCD.. FOR INTER-GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, TOWARDS
ADAPTIVE FEDERALISM I, 8 (1981). The illustration that follows in the text is adapted from
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
1484, 1494 (1987).
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Generalizing from this point, in a pluralist world where we assume
that outcomes accurately reflect majority will, the larger the number of
jurisdictional units, the larger the surplus of winners over losers. On this
basis alone, an ultrapluralist would logically prefer that governmental
decisions be made at the most decentralized level possible. When one
adds to this insight the prospect that decentralization will induce
migrations of voters to jurisdictions that more closely reflect their
individual tastes and preferences,59 the pluralist case for federalism is
even more compelling.
This account overlooks many complexities, such as
interjurisdictional spillovers and the possibility that decentralized
decisionmaking will lead to a regulatory race to the bottom.60 But for an
optimistic pluralist like Chief Justice Rehnquist, who is largely innocent
of the insights of public choice theory, these difficulties may not loom
large. In any event, even if such a pluralist recognized that exceptions
exist, this would not detract from the force of the general point, which
should be sufficient to establish at least a presumptive rule in favor of
localized, rather than centralized, decisionmaking.
Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist's consistent preference for
restrictions on federal court jurisdiction and powers can also be derived
from his specific brand of ultrapluralism.61 For such a pluralist, the
proper function of federal courts is to enforce federal law as agreed
upon by legislative majorities (in the case of statutes) or supermajorities
(in the case of constitutional provisions).62 To the extent that federal
courts go beyond these functions, as they will constantly be asked to
59. See Charles M. Tiebout, A
416 (1956).

Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J.

POL. EcON.

60. See Richard Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the
"Race to the Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 61 N. Y.U. L. REV.

1210 (1992).
61. For an

·

elaboration on the theme that Chief Justice Rehnquist has consistently
sought to restrict federal judicial power, see William V. Luneburg, Justice Rehnquist,
Statutory Interpretation, the Policies of Clear Statement, and Federal Jurisdiction, 58 IND.
L.J. 211 (1982).
62. Note that the proper performance of these functions requires a degree of judicial
independence from the political branches. Chief Justice Rehnquist thus recognizes the
need for an independent judiciary. For example, he has expressed relief over the failure of
the 1804 impeachment of Justice Samuel Chase, because this episode established that
federal judges could be not be impeached because of congressional disagreement with their
decisions. WIT.LIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS 10, 118-119, 275-78 (1992). As he
notes, the absence of any tradition supporting impeachment for ideological reasons
"surely contributed as much to the maintenance of our tripartite federal system of
government as any case decided by any court." Id. at 278.

1994)

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

641

do, 63 they will perform as just another pluralist institution. In the
absence of a majority vote on the issue, however, there is no objective
basis for approving or disapproving the courts' decisions or ascertaining
whether they advance the common good. It follows that allowing more
decisions to be made by federal courts simply substitutes
decisionmaking by a defective pluralist institution-one which is
imposing its own parochial and subjective idea of the good-for
· decisionmaking by better pluralist institutions. To minimize this danger,
the ultrapluralist follows a presumptive rule of always construing the
jurisdiction and powers of the federal courts narrowly.
It is important not to overstate the extent to which Chief Justice
Rehnquist' s hierarchy of values conforms to what one would predict
from an ultrapluralist. Certain anomalies remain. For example, Chief
Justice Rehnquist appears to be somewhat sympathetic to claims that
state and local governments have engaged in an uncompensated taking
of property. 64 Presumably, a thoroughgoing ultrapluralist would have
little sympathy for takings claims-which, after all, are claims of
individual rights grounded in federal law that frustrate outcomes
adopted by local legislative majorities. To be sympathetic to takings
claims, a judge must harbor some suspicion of local democratic
institutions,65 and have some degree of faith in the capacity of courts to
define property rights independently of the definition implicitly adopted
by local authorities. To be sure, Chief Justice Rehnquist is at best only a
sometime enthusiast for the Takings Clause, and has written opinions
rejecting takings claims that conflict with state and local policies.66 Still,
the fact that he is at least a mild takings enthusiast (relative to some
other Justices) is some evidence that his faith in the interest-summing
capacities of state and local legislatures has its limits.

63. See Rehnquist, supra note 33.
64. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the majority opinions in Lucas v.
South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Nollan v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran v.
County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304 (1987). He authored dissents in two other prominent
takings cases. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 506
(1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. I discuss the relationship between optimism and pessimism about politics and
one's attitude toward the Takings Clause in Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the
Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1561, 1584-85 (1986).
66. See Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989); Pruneyard Shopping
Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 79 (1980).
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N. IMPLICATIONS FOR STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
One shortcoming of the hierarchy-of-values accounts of Chief
Justice Rehnquist' s judicial record is their focus on constitutional
decisions, where issues of individual rights, federalism, and the scope
of federal court jurisdiction loom largest. The negative implication may
be that there is nothing remarkable about Chief Justice Rehnquist' s
statutory interpretation decisions-that he adopts a conventional
pragmatic or ad hoc "political" approach to such issues. Once we see
that Chief Justice Rehnquist's value commitments can all be derived
from a particular version of pluralism, however, it is also possible to see
that this ultrapluralism should generate presumptive guidelines for
statutory interpretation. Specifically, I will argue that four general
guidelines follow from the tenets of the ultrapluralist theory I have
ascribed to Chief Justice Rehnquist.
First and most fundamentally, one would expect the general
question in every case of statutory interpretation to be: what was the
"deal" struck by Congress when it adopted this particular piece of
legislation? This follows from the general pluralist premise that
legislation reflects compromise between competing private interests,
coupled with the ultrapluralist understanding that this process generally
produces an accurate summing of those interests. On these
assumptions, legislation should be viewed as a negotiated bargain-and
most likely a good one at that. The proper role of the court is to try to
figure out what exactly was agreed upon, and to enforce that
understanding.
This, of course, is the conception of statutory interpretation
advanced in early law and economics literature, where the proper
posture of the court was depicted as being that of the faithful agent
carrying out the "deal" that was agreed upon by the contesting factions
in the legislature.67 As developed most fully by Judge Posner, the
67. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an
Interest Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & EcoN. 875 (1975); Richard A. Posner, Economics,
Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982);
Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50
U. CHI. L. REv. 800 (1983). More recently, as law-and-economics scholars have become
increasingly influenced by public choice theory, the nonnative appeal of the faithful
agent model has been called into question. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes'
Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains];
Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory
Interpretation: an Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). For example,
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proper inquiry for such a faithful agent is to ask the counterfactual
question: what would a majority of the legislature have decided upon if
it had expressly attended to the issue of statutory interpretation? Thus,
the bargain-enforcing faithful agent tries to put himself into the shoes of
the enacting legislators, and to predict how they would have decided the
question if they had focused on it directly.68
What implications does such a faithful agent conception have for the
major issues of controversy in the world of statutory interpretation:
originalism versus presentism, intentionalism versus textualism, and the
role of legislative history? Because the process of interpretation is seen
as carrying out the wishes of the enacting legislature, the faithful agent
would clearly be an originalist. Statutes must be given the meaning they
had when the legislative command was issued. Any notion of
presentism, dynamic, or evolving interpretation69 would be anathema.
Similarly, the orientation of the faithful agent is intentionalist rather
than textualist. The role of the interpreter under the faithful agent model
is to ascertain, as best possible, how the enacting legislature would have
decided the issue if it had been addressed directly. This is another way
of saying that the interpreter is trying to discover "legislative intent."70
Judge Posner has apparently abandoned the agency model in favor of what he calls
"pragmatism." See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OP JURISPRUDENCE 270 (1990).
Judge Easterbrook has also endorsed textualism. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of
Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 59, 62 (1988).
Since the Chief Justice does not share public choice theory's pessimism about democratic
institutions, for him the proper posture of the court in cases of statutory interpretation
should be that of the faithful agent.
68. The foremost judicial proponent of this "counterfactual" approach to statutory
interpretation is probably Judge Learned Hand. See Fishgold v. Sullivan Drydock & Repair
Corp., 154 F.2d 785 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 328 U.S. 275 (1946); Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v.
Yensavage, 218 F. 547, 552-53 (2d Cir. 1914); LEARNED HAND, How Far is a Judge Free in
Rendering a Decision?, in THE SPIRIT OP LIBERTY 105-10 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960).
Not coincidentally, Hand too shared many of the tenets of what I have called
ultrapluralism, including a strong belief in democratic institutions and moral skepticism,
as captured in his famous line that he would find it "most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of
Platonic guardians." LEARNED HAND, THE Bn.L OP RIGHTS 73 (1958); see also LEARNED
HAND, Democracy: Its Presumptions and Realities, in THE SPIRIT OP LIBERTY, supra, at 90102; Learned Hand, Is There a Common Will?, 28 MICH. L. RBv. 46, 50-51 (1929)
(acknowledging the pluralist character of legislatures, but recognizing majoritarian "nosecounting" as the best available approach to government).
69. The dynamic or evolutionary perspective is defended in T. Alexander Aleinikoff,
Updating Statutory Interpretation, 81 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. RBv. 1479 (1987). For criticism, see
Steven D. Smith, Law Without Mind, 88 MICH. L. REV. 20 (1987).
70. In this sense, the faithful agent model is simply a version of what has been
called the "traditional model" of statutory interpretation. See Earl M. Maltz, Rhetoric and
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Under this orientation, the text of the statute is in effect regarded as
evidence of the law, rather than the law itself. Although the text of the
statute will invariably be regarded as the best evidence of what the
enacting legislature would have decided, it is quite possible that the plain
meaning of the text may be overcome by other evidence. If the court
concludes that the plain meaning is contrary to what a majority of the
legislature would have wanted, then the intention rather than the
meaning controls.
Finally, because the process of interpretation entails a prediction
about what a group of historical actors would have decided about an
issue left unresolved, the faithful agent interpreter will be most
interested in the legislative history of an enactment. This does not mean
that the faithful agent will be incautious in using such evidence. A
contrived colloquy between two interested legislators might not
accurately reflect the understanding of a majority of the legislators who
voted for the measure. But caution surely would not rise to the level of a
prophylactic rule of exclusion as urged by Justice Scalia. Legislative
history can disclose important insights about shared assumptions that
can be critical in interpreting ambiguities or gaps in statutes. Thus, the
faithful agent will want to rely on both official and unofficial historical
materials, taking appropriate care to remember that the ultimate inquiry
is to predict how the majority would have wanted the issue to be
decided, not to enforce the private expectations of a small group of
manipulators.
Beyond the basic commitment to the faithful agent model of
interpretation, Chief Justice Rehnquist' s ultrapluralism has other
implications for statutory interpretation. First, one would expect a
pluralist of his stripe to be sympathetic to calls for deference to
interpretations of statutes adopted by executive branch agencies. The
faithful agent's inquiry into what the majority of the enacting legislature
would want will often yield highly uncertain results. In such cases, the
faithful agent, left to his own devices, can only make an educated guess
based on the available evidence. In effect, however, such guesses will
entail a choice between conflicting social policies- the type of decision
that ideally should be resolved in a pluralist world by a more democratic

body.

Reality in the Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Underenforcement, Overenforcement,
and the Problem of Legislative Supremacy, 71 B.U. L. REv. 767, 769-70 (1991).
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In these circumstances, if another branch of government more
accountable to the public than the courts has rendered an interpretation
of the statute, pluralist theory would suggest that the court should defer
to the views of the accountable interpreter. 71 Such an accountable
institution will presumably do a better job of summing the competing
private interests involved than will an unelected court. This is very
similar to the thesis of the Supreme Court's Chevron decision. 72
Chevron reasoned that administrative decisionmakers are more
electorally accountable than courts, because they are appointed by and
must generally answer to the President, who is elected. 73 Gaps and
ambiguities in statutes should therefore be filled in by agency officials
rather than having courts impose their own views of correct policy.
Thus, one would predict that a pluralist like Chief Justice Rehnquist
would be a strong supporter of Chevron deference.74
Second, given Chief Justice Rehnquist' s strong commitment to
federalism-which as we have seen can also be derived from his
pluralist premises-one would expect that he would strongly endorse
the use of canons of construction grounded in precepts of federalism. 75
Included here would be various clear statement rules, such as the
presumption against federal conditions on state administration of federal
spending programs,76 the presumption against congressional waiver of
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 77 the presumption against
congressional regulation of core state functions, 78 and the presumption
against abrogation of concurrent state court jurisdiction to enforce
federal statutes. 79 And of course, one would expect such a pluralist to
71. See Thomas W. Merrill, Pluralism, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Behavior of
the Independent Judiciary, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 396,399 (1993).
72. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc.,

(1984).

467 U.S. 837

7 3. Id. at 865-66.
7 4. The pluralist argument for deference to agency interpretations is similar to the
argument Chief Justice Rehnquist has advanced in support of a revived nondelegation
doctrine. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. The ideal ultrapluralist solution
in cases of doubt would be a "remand" to the legislature, as per the nondelegation doctrine.
Given the Court's unwillingness to endorse that solution, the next best course would be to
accept the interpretative views of the executive branch.
15. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional

Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 619-29
(1992) (detailing the rise of federalism-based clear statement rules in the Rehnquist Court).

76.

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. l (1981).
473 U.S. 234 (1985).
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990).

77. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon,

78.
79.
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take seriously the venerable canon that clear evidence is required before
determining that Congress has intended to preempt state and local
regulation in any given area. 80
Finally, one would expect a jurist driven by a philosophy of
ultrapluralism to be relatively indifferent to considerations of stare
decisis. 81 Stare decisis is a policy supported by values that inhere in the
idea of the rule of law, such as predictability, equal treatment, and the
protection of reliance interests. 82 But the policy is a judicial creation; it
has not been mandated or endorsed by any legislative majority. Thus,
for an optimistic pluralist who views courts as another pluralist
institution and who is skeptical about the objectivity of concepts of the
public good, any clash between claims of stare decisis and legislative
intent should be resolved in favor of legislative intent.
V. CIDEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST'S APPROACH TO STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION

A review of Justice Rehnquist' s many statutory interpretation
opinions since he joined the Court in 1972 suggests that he has largely
conformed to the pattern that one would expect from an ultrapluralist.
To be sure, the evidence of congruence between theory and practice is
not quite as strong as it is with respect to the basic commitments
identified by the hierarchy-of-values analysts. This may perhaps be
explained by the fact that the stakes are lower in the statutory
interpretation cases, and so strategic behavior by the Chief Justice, e.g.,
joining opinions he might prefer were written differently, is likely to be
more pronounced. All in all, however, we find more confirmation of a
basic pluralist orientation of the type I have described.

A. Faithful-Agent Interpretation
Perhaps the best way to determine Chief Justice Rehnquist's basic
orientation to questions of statutory interpretation-whether he accepts
80. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
81 . The key may be philosophy, not pluralism. As Anthony Kronman has observed:
''The law accords the past an authority that philosophy does not-an authority which
indeed is incompatible with the independent spirit of all philosophical reflection."
Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE LJ. 1029, 1034 (1990). Anyone
who tries to reduce law to legal philosophy will almost inevitably disparage the role of
precedent in law.
82. See, e.g., Frederick Schaller, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987).
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the faithful agent model, textualism, dynamic interpretation, or some
combination of these approaches that might be called
"pragmatism"83-is to examine statutory interpretation opinions he has
written, especially those where there is reason to believe he is operating
with a relatively unforced hand. I would include in this category both
majority opinions where the issue is relatively obscure (and thus
unlikely to engender much interest or suggestion for revision from
concurring Justices), and concurring and dissenting opinions.
A review of these opinions discloses no occasion on which the
Chief Justice has expressly cast the task of statutory interpretation in
terms of a faithful agent enforcing the bargain reached in Congress.
Nevertheless, it is reasonably clear that he generally views the task of
the Court to be one of reconstructing the values and attitudes that the
members of the enacting Congress brought to bear on the problem.
Implicit in this approach is the understanding that the relevant inquiry is
how the enacting legislature would have resolved the issue if it had
expressly confronted it. As we have seen, this is precisely the approach
that the faithful agent model of ultrapluralism seems to require.
I have selected two of Chief Justice Rehnquist' s majority opinions
to illustrate his basic approach to statutory construction. The first,
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 84 presented the question whether a district
court could award attorney's fees to a nonprevailing party under a
provision of the Clean Air Act authorizing courts to award fees
"whenever it determines that such an award is appropriate." 85 The
expansive language of the statute might have been construed as a
delegation of authority to courts to construct a "common law" of fee
shifting,86 in which case, of course, the Court would have been free to
decide that an award of fees to nonprevailing parties was either
"appropriate" or "inappropriate." Significantly, however, Justice
Rehnquist eschewed any such analysis. Instead, he framed the inquiry
in terms of the general understanding associated with the "American
rule" prohibiting any fee shifting absent special legislative
83. For an overview of different modes of statutory interpretation, see Maltz, supra
note 70; Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1076-1087 (1992).
84. 463 U.S. 680 (1983).

85. 42 u.s.c. § 7607(f) (1982).
86. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common I.Aw Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Cm.
L. REv. 1 (1985) (discussing statutory delegations of common lawmaking authority to
federal courts); Easterbrook, Statutes Domains, supra note 67.
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authorization. 87 He then canvassed other fee-shifting statutes in order to
show that ordinarily Congress permits fee awards only to prevailing
parties. 88 The conclusion was that although Congress did not explicitly
limit fees to prevailing parties in the Clean Air Act, it was probable that
Congress would have agreed on such a limitation if it had attended to
the issue specifically.
Justice Rehnquist' s opinion in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club also
undertook a careful analysis of the legislative history. Interestingly, the
history contained what could be regarded as a "smoking gun"-a
passage in a House Report stating explicitly that the Committee did not
intend to impose a "prevailing party" requirement. 89 Notwithstanding
this statement, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the totality of the
history revealed at most a consensus in favor of rejecting a requirement
that a party prevail on all issues in order to receive a fee. It was not clear
that the cited report was saying anything more than that a party that
prevailed in part would be eligible for a fee.90 Absent more definitive
evidence of an intention to depart from the general practice revealed in
other statutes, Justice Rehnquist concluded that Congress intended to
require that a party prevail at least in part in order to be eligible for a fee.
Several aspects of the Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club decision are
characteristic of the approach to statutory interpretation one would
expect from an ultrapluralist. First, and not surprisingly, the opinion
rejects any suggestion that the statute embodies a delegation of
discretionary lawmaking power to courts. Given the preferred status of
legislatures relative to courts as interest-summing institutions, one
would expect an ultrapluralist to be reluctant to endorse a statutorilymandated federal common law.9 1 Second, consistent with the faithful
agent approach to interpretation, it is not surprising that the opinion
implicitly frames the issue in terms of what a majority of the Congress
would have decided had it addressed the issue explicitly. Finally,
although the opinion makes free use of legislative history, it does not
fall prey to the error of simply looking for the legislative history most

87.
88.
89.
90.

463 U.S. at 683-84.

Id. at 683-86.
Id. at 686-87.
Id. at 689-90.
91. Chief Justice Rehnquist has in fact sought to limit the scope of federal common
law. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
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directly on point and enforcing as "the law."92 Instead-as one would
expect of an approach that tries to ascertain the shared understanding of
all actors in the legislative process-it looks to general background
understandings and the pattern of results reached under similar statutes
in order to predict what a majority would have decided if it had
addressed the issue.
The second decision, Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 93 concerned a
much older statute-the Union Pacific Act of 1862. That Act
established a "checkerboard square" pattern of land grants, with the
railroad being given alternative sections along a broad right-of-way and
the government retaining the remainder.94 The question was whether
the government retained an implied easement of way over the sections
granted to the railroad, in order to assure access to otherwise landlocked
sections it had retained.
Neither the language of the statute nor the legislative history
adverted to the easement issue, and Chief Justice Rehnquist set about
with considerable gusto to try to infer what Congress would have
wanted given the shared assumptions and expectations of the time.
Drawing freely from secondary sources and painting on a broad canvas,
the Chief Justice surveyed the history of the development of the
transcontinental railroads, and the reasons for the development of the
checkerboard land grant scheme.95 He even digressed to describe the
Battle of Glorieta Pass in New Mexico in 1862, apparently to illustrate
the urgency Congress perceived in constructing supply lines to support
Union troops in the West.96 Implicit in this approach, again, is the
assumption that the proper resolution of the interpretative question is to
determine what the enacting legislature would have decided if it had
considered the issue explicitly.
Chief Justice Rehnquist's attempt in Leo Sheep to answer that
question based on his historical researches was not wholly successful.
The best he could come up with was the inference that Congress would
have concluded that the problem would take care of itself.97 This may
not be enough to overcome the canon (relied upon by the government)
92. Well before Justice Scalia's arrival on the Court, then-Justice Rehnquist
recognized the potential for manipulation inherent in "potted" legislative history. See
Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 17-18 (1978) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
93. 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
94. See GEORGE C. COGGINS, PuBuc NAnJRAL REsOURCES LAW ch. 10 (1990).
95. Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 670-77.
96. Id. at 674-75.
97. Id. at 686.
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that any doubts regarding federal land grants "are resolved for the
government, not against it."98 Still, Leo Sheep reveals the lengths to
which Chief Justice Rehnquist is prepared to go in order to recreate the
mindset of the enacting Congress. Even when the language of the
statute and the legislative history are silent, he is prepared to tum to
extralegislative historical sources in order to try to predict how the
enacting legislature would have resolved the issue, and prefers this to
relying on canons.
The approach to statutory interpretation in Ruckelshaus v. Sierra
Club and Leo Sheep is by no means unique. Quite a number of Chief
Justice Rehnquist's statutory interpretation opinions reveal the similar
features.9 9 These opinions make it abundantly clear that Chief Justice
Rehnquist rejects any type of presentist or dynamic approach to
statutory interpretation. For example, in Smith v. Wade 100 the issue was
what degree of culpability is required to award punitive damages in
actions brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (enacted as part of the
Civil Rights Act of 1871). Justice Brennan's majority opinion rejected a
malicious intent requirement, relying on "the common law of torts
(both modem and as of 1871), with such modification or adaptation as
might be necessary to carry out the purpose and policy of the
statute."10 1 Thus, the majority adopted an approach thar contained
strong elements of a dynamic or evolutionary approach to statutory
interpretation.102
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist strenuously rejected any
reliance on modem tort doctrine in construing § 1983:
The reason our earlier decisions interpreting § 1983 have relied upon
common law decisions is simple: members of the 42d Congress were
lawyers, familiar with the law of their time. In resolving ambiguities in
the enactments of that Congress, as with other Congresses, it is useful to

98. Id. at 682 (quoting Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617
(1978)).
99. See, e.g., Hendrik Hudson Cent. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176
(1982); County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 181 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Pennhurst State Sch. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 219 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); California v.
United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); Philbrook v. Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707 (1975); City of
Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
100. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
101. Id. at 34 (citing Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253-64 (1978)).
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consider the legal principles and rules that shaped the thinking of its
members. The decisions of state courts decided well after 1871, while of
some academic interest, are largely irrelevant to what members of the
42d Congress intended by way of a standard for punitive damages. 103

Thus, although Justice Rehnquist again made free use of historical
background materials, his Smith v. Wade dissent makes clear that the
relevance of these materials is in reconstructing the shared
understandings of the members of the enacting Congress, not in
establishing an implicit delegation allowing courts to inject a dynamic
element into statutory interpretation.104
It is slightly more difficult to show that Chief Justice Rehnquist
rejects textualism, although here too I think the ultimate judgment is
clear. Chief Justice Rehnquist clearly regards the language of the statute
as the most important datum in ascertaining legislative intent. 105 And he
will enforce the literal meaning of the statute, if he is convinced that it
fairly reflects congressional intent. 106 But he has expressly declined to
enforce the "plain meaning" of a statute when it is contradicted by the
general background and legislative history of the provision in question.
For example, in Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 107 the issue was
whether Congress had unilaterally modified a tribe's reservation
boundaries when it adopted legislation in 1904 providing for a
"cession" of certain lands. The tribe argued that a "cession" requires
bilateral consent, and because the tribe had not consented, the land was
still within the reservation. Writing for the Court, Justice Rehnquist
agreed that "[a]s a matter of strict English usage," the tribe was correct
about the meaning of the word "cession." 10 8 In context, however, he
found that the objectives of Congress were clear: the land had been
102.

See WDliAM N.

EsKJUDGE, JR. & PHiuP P. FRICKEY, LEGISLATION: STATUTES

AND THE CREATION OF PuBuc POLICY

278-92 (1988).
103. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 66 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104. The Smith v. Wade dissent also clarifies the role of policy arguments in
faithful agent statutory interpretation. Such arguments are relevant, but only insofar as the
policies can be shown to be ones that the enacting legislature would have found
persuasive. See 461 U.S. at 86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
105. See, e.g., NOW, Inc. v. Scheidler, _ U.S. _, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994);
Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. _, 113 S. CL 1119 (1993); Wilder v. Virginia Hosp.
Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 526 (1990) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
106. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982); see also infra notes
110-12 and accompanying text.
107. 430 U.S. 584 (1977).
108. Id. at 597.
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withdrawn without regard to whether the tribe gave its consent. Quoting
from Holmes, Justice Rehnquist observed: "[W]e are not free to say to
Congress: 'We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it, and
therefore we shall go on as before. "'109
It is true that on at least one occasion Justice Rehnquist has enforced
the "literal" meaning of the statute in circumstances where the result
would very likely have been rejected by the enacting Congress if it had
been presented with the facts of the specific case at band. 110 But he did
so only after establishing that the general rule reflected in the literal
language of the statute is one that the enacting Congress very likely
would have agreed with. 111 Thus, this particular example of "literalism"
means (at most) that be sees the need to undertake the inquiry at a level
of generality commensurate with the language of the statute. 11 2 The
question is: What rule would Congress have agreed to had it expressly
considered the issue? The question is not: How would Congress want
this particular case to come out? Given the understanding that Congress
legislates for the generality of cases, not for individual applications, it is
not inconsistent with a pluralist perspective to try to identify the shared
understanding at the level of a general rule.
It is also true that in recent years Chief Justice Rehnquist, like other
members of the Court, has authored opinions that avoid any discussion
of legislative history.I 13 But I do not believe these opinions necessarily
signal a change of heart on the part of the Chief Justice about the correct
general approach to issues of statutory interpretation. A simpler
explanation is that they are majority opinions joined by Justice Scalia,
who bas often refused to join majority opinions that contain a

109. Id. at 597 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908)).
110. Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982) (upholding "literal"
interpretation of penalty for withholding seaman's wages that resulted in award of over
$300,000).
111. Id. at 571.
112. As my colleague Michael Perry has recently written: "According to
originalism, . . . a judge should not try to articulate the directive represented by a
constitutional provision (as originally understood) at a level of generality any broaderor any narrower-than the relevant materials ('words, structure, and history') warrant."
MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: THE JUDICIAL PROTECTION OF
CoNsnnmONAL RIGHTS 23 (1994).
113. See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Demarest v.
Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184 (1991).
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discussion of legislative history.I 14 Chief Justice Rehnquist is surely
aware of this, and consequently to avoid fragmenting the Court has
apparently agreed to drop the erstwhile obligatory discussion of
legislative history. 11 5 On the other hand, there is little evidence that
Chief Justice Rehnquist shares or is even sympathetic to Justice Scalia's
strong allergy to legislative history. He has generally declined to join in
Justice Scalia's diatribes against legislative history, and has frequently
associated himself with opinions that Justice Scalia finds
objectionable. 116 Thus, the most that can be inferred from the recent
decisions is that Chief Justice Rehnquist cares less about the
controversy over the use of legislative history than Justice Scalia does.
B. Deference to Agency Interpretations

There is also evidence to suggest that Chief Justice Rehnquist is
somewhat more than ordinarily willing to defer to interpretations
adopted by politically accountable institutions. Here it is possible to
proceed on a more quantitative basis. In a previously-published study, I
collected all Supreme Court decisions from the 1981 Term through the
1990 Term that involved a question whether to defer to an
administrative construction of a federal statute. 117 For the ten Terms in
question, the Court considered a total of 135 deference cases, and
accepted the executive view in ninety-eight (seventy-three percent
overall). During this same period, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed with
the agency interpretation eighty-six times (sixty-four percent overall).
Thus, considering only this data, it would appear that Chief Justice
Rehnquist is somewhat less deferential to executive interpretations than

114. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
U. L.Q. 351,365 (1994).
115. See County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 182 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (noting that reference to legislative history is conventional and criticizing
majority for deciding case on policy grounds rather than legislative history). For data on
the precipitous decline in legislative in the Supreme Court in recent years, see Merrill,
supra note 114.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Thompson/Center Arms Co.,_ U.S._, 112 S. Ct.
2102 (1992) (plurality opinion); Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597
(1991); Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103 (1990); Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist.,
491 U.S. 701 (1989).
117. Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J.
969 (1992).
WASH.
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is the Court on the whole, contrary to what the ultrapluralist model
would predict.
When we break the data down into time periods, however, a slightly
different picture emerges. Prior to the Court's 1984 decision in
Chevron, the practice of deferring to agency interpretations was justified
largely in terms of agency expertise or the protection of reliance interests
associated with longstanding agency interpretations. 11 8 There is no
reason to believe that an ultrapluralist of the type I have described would
be particularly inclined to defer to agency views for these reasons. After
Chevron, and especially after Justice Scalia's arrival on the Court, the
practice of deference came to be associated with democratic theory, and
in particular with the idea that administrative agencies are more
politically accountable than courts.1 19 Once this understanding gained
currency, one would assume that an ultrapluralist would demonstrate a
greater willingness (relatively speaking) to defer to agency views.
And indeed, if we look only at the four Terms after Justice Scalia's
arrival (1987-1990), we see a different pattern. During this period, the
Court's deference to agency interpretations dropped to sixty percent
(thirty-four out of fifty-seven cases). Chief Justice Rehnquist, however,
continued to defer at his old rate of sixty-four percent (thirty-five of
fifty-five). Thus, whereas the Chief Justice deferred somewhat less than
the Court as a whole prior to Justice Scalia's arrival, afterwards he
became slightly more deferential than the Court as a whole. By contrast,
it is interesting to note that Justice Scalia-the supposed champion of
Chevron deference-deferred at the rate of only forty-nine percent
(twenty-seven of fifty-five). At least one thing seem clear: Chief Justice
Rehnquist is more deferential to executive views than is Justice Scalia
Moreover, there is some reason to believe that in cases that involve
particularly sensitive issues of public policy, Chief Justice Rehnquist is
especially willing to defer to administrative interpretations. In the
controversial Rust v. Sullivanl20 decision, for example, the Court
considered a regulation of the Department of Health and Human
Services which prohibited recipients of federal family planning funds
from engaging in abortion counseling, referral, or encouraging abortion
118.

Id. at 972-75.
119. Justice Scalia has been an especially vigorous proponent and exponent of
Chevron. See Antonin Scalia. Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKEL.J. 511.
120. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
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as a family planning technique. 121 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for
the Court found that the statutory language on the question was
ambiguous, 122 and held that under the Chevron framework deference to
the Secretary's interpretation was required. He did so even though a
plausible argument could be made that the gag rule was unconstitutional
under the First Amendment, thus giving rise to the canon that
interpretations raising difficult constitutional questions are
disfavored.1 23 For an ultrapluralist, however, it would be logical for a
court to give greater weight to the views of an accountable interpreter
than to decide on the basis of the outer reaches of judge-made First
Amendment law. The Chief Justice's willingness to rest on Chevron
deference in this context thus should not be surprising. 124
C. Federalism Canons

Given Chief Justice Rehnquist's unusually strong commitment to
federalism, as documented by the hierarchy-of-values analysts, it should
come as no surprise that he uniformly supports the use of federalism
canons in cases of statutory interpretation. Consider for example the
Atascadero canon125 that federal statutes will not be construed as
permitting suit against states absent a clear and unequivocal statement
121. Id. at 177-81.
122. Id. at 184.
123. See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Consb-. Trades
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 500
(1979).
124. Another type of accountable interpreter that an ultrapluralist might heed in
cases of doubt is subsequent Congresses. Reliance on post-enactment legislative history
is especially controversial, given the increased dangers of manipulation. But where this
danger is minimized, one might expect an ultrapluralist to rely on subsequent
congressional action in determining the correct meaning of a statute, for example, where
Congress as a whole has reenacted legislation after a particular interpretation by lower
courts. See generally William K. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH.
L. REv. 67 (1988). There is some evidence that Chief Justice Rehnquist is willing to rely
on subsequent legislative action in this context. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v.
GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13 (1980) ("Subsequent legislation declaring the
intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory construction."); Laird v.
Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 802 (1972) (Congress's failure to amend the Federal Tort Claims
Act, and passage of a separate bill granting relief to specific individuals injured as a result
of low flying jets, shows that Congress intended to import the doctrine of absolute
liability into the Act).
125. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
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from Congress. The canon builds upon an earlier opinion by Justice
Rehnquist, 126 and has been applied by Chief Justice Rehnquist in
subsequent decisions.1 27 Where disputes arise over the application of
the canon, Chief Justice Rehnquist consistently sides with the faction
that does not find the requisite clear statement has been made.128 A
similar story could be told about the Pennhurst canon 129 and the
Gregory canon.130
Preemption cases, which ultimately tum on the interpretation of
federal statutes, merit a separate word. It is an established canon in
preemption cases that the historic police powers of the States are not to
be superseded by federal statute "unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."131 Unlike other Justices, who either quote the
canon or disregard it as suits the needs of the day, Chief Justice
Rehnquist appears to take it quite seriously. 132 Overall, he has complied
a very consistent record of opposition to preemption claims (again,
relative to other Justices).13 3 Of particular interest here is a growing
divergence with Justice Scalia. Applying his textualist method of
126. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 668,674 (1974).
127. See Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
128. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 492 U.S. 96
(1989) (plurality opinion) (interpreting § 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code); Welch v. Texas
Dep't of Highways, 483 U.S. 468 (1987) (interpreting the Jones Act); Papasan v. Allain,
478 U.S. 265 (1986) (petitioner's trust claims were barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
129. This canon originated in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), and has been invoked by Justice
Rehnquist in a subsequent decision to deny relief. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S._, 112
S. Ct. 1360 (1992); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 524 (1990)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 298 (1987)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
130. Gregory relied in part on Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The Chief Justice has indicated a willingness to apply that
canon in later cases. See Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). But see Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys.
Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 112 S. Ct. 560, 565-66 (1991) (majority opinion, Rehnquist,
C.J., joining).
131. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,230 (1947).
132. See, e.g., Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 620
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 543 (1977)
(Rehnquist, J ., concurring and dissenting); City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal,
411 U.S. 624, 643 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
133. In addition to the decisions cited supra note 132, see Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S.
l, 25 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan v. de la Cuesta, 458
U.S. 141, 172 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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interpretation, Justice Scalia has on several occasions found state laws
preempted in situations where Chief Justice Rehnquist, following the
clear intent canon, has voted to uphold the challenged state
regulation.134

D. Statutory Stare Decisis
It is well known that Chief Justice Rehnquist is not a strong
adherent of stare decisis in constitutional matters. 135 He has written
opinions in many cases either overruling136 or mging the overruling of
constitutional decisions.13 7 Although the rule of stare decisis is
generally regarded as being stronger in statutory cases, l38 there is also
evidence that Chief Justice Rehnquist is not a particularly strong
proponent of precedent in the statutory context either. For example, after
Congress failed to follow his recommendation to modify the law of
federal habeas corpus in certain respects, 139 he nevertheless authored or
joined a series of decisions that accomplished similar ends by cutting
back on or directly overruling Warren Court precedents. 140 He also
134. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., joining majority);

Group, Inc., SOS U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2608
cf. id. at 2632 (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Morales v. TWA, Inc., 504 U.S._, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2054 (1992)
(Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, C.J.).
135. Earl M. Maltz, No Rules in a Knife Fight: Chief Justice Rehnquist and the
Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 25 RtITGERS L.J. 669 (1994).
136. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 2609-11 (1991); Solorio
v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987); National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833

(1976).
137. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2855-67
(1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (urging overruling of
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528, 557 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (urging future overruling of the case at hand).
138. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Marshall, "Let Congress Do It": The Case for an
Absolute Rule of Statutory Stare Decisis, 88 MICH. L. REV. 177 (1989).
139. For details, see Larry W. Yaclde, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
2331, 2357-73 (1993).
140. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. _, 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993) (majority
opinion authored by Rehnquist, C.J.) (adopting stricter harmless error standard for
purposes of habeas corpus review); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991) (majority
opinion authored by Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (rejecting deliberate
abandonment standard and adopting strict cause-and-prejudice standard for determining
abuse of the writ); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (majority opinion authored by
O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.) (adopting position that new constitutional
rulings will not be applied retroactively on habeas corpus review). Chief Justice Rehnquist
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joined the order in Patterson v. McLean 141 which directed the parties to
address the question whether an earlier interpretation of the statute there
in question should be overruled.
To be sure, Chief Justice Rehnquist will occasionally bow to
considerations of stare decisis in statutory cases. Consider in this regard
the decision in California v. Federal Employees Retirement
Commission.1 42 Simplifying somewhat, the issue was whether the
Court would follow an old Supreme Court precedent closely on point
interpreting a section of the Federal Power Act, 143 or a more recent case
(authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist) that provided a more
comprehensive analysis of the legislative history of the relevant
provision. 144 In effect, for the Chief Justice the case presented a direct
clash between a precedent and his understanding of the legislative intent.
Interestingly, he chose to join Justice O'Connor's unanimous opinion
for the Court following the older precedent rather than his own prior
analysis of legislative intent. 145 Thus, the claim that Chief Justice
Rehnquist is a weak adherent of stare decisis in statutory cases must be
understood in context. Like all members of the Court, he bows to stare
decisis when a powerful claim can be made that prior Supreme Court
precedent is directly controlling.
All in all, it is fair to say that Chief Justice Rehnquist's performance
in statutory interpretation cases confirms the hypothesis that he is driven
by an ultrapluralist theory of politics. The evidence is somewhat weaker
than it is with respect the hierarchy of values identified by previous
commentators, focusing primarily on constitutional cases. Perhaps not
surprisingly, the strongest support consists of his consistent invocation
of federalism canons. It is also possible to discern the faithful agent
model of interpretation at work in Chief Justice Rehnquist's
unconstrained statutory interpretation opinions. There is modest
has of course long been associated with revisionism in interpretation of the federal habeas
corpus statutes. See Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (majority opinion authored
by Rehnquist, J.) (adopting cause-and-prejudice standard for assessing failures to follow
state procedural rules, and confining Fay v. Noia to its facts).
141. 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
142. 495 U.S. 490 (1990).
143. First Iowa Hydro-Blee. Coop. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
144. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 653-63 (1978).
145. This could have been an exercise in damage control. By voting with the
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist retained control over assignment of the opinion, and by
assigning it to Justice O'Connor, who is highly sympathetic to States' rights, he assured
that the opinion was narrowly written.

1994]

INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

659

evidence that he is more deferential to executive agencies than other
Justices. Finally, although his ultrapluralism is qualified by a stronger
allegiance to stare decisis in statutory cases, he is more willing to
disregard precedent in this context than other Justices.

VI.

~ TExTUALIST ALTERNATIVE

The importance of Justice Rehnquist' s pluralism to his statutory
interpretation opinions is highlighted further when we contrast the Chief
Justice's performance in this area with that of Justice Scalia. Since
arriving on the Court, Justice Scalia has staked out a very clear
conception of proper judicial method in statutory interpretation casesperhaps clearer than that of any other Justice in history.1 46 What is
unclear is whether, or how, this conception of judicial method relates to
an underlying theory of the political order analogous to Chief Justice
Rehnquist' s ultrapluralism.
Justice Scalia's method of statutory interpretation has been aptly
described as a ·form of "textualism."1 47 Like the faithful agent
conception I have described, Justice Scalia's textualism is originalist
rather than presentist in orientation. That is, it seeks the meaning of the
statute in terms of understandings current at the time of enactment, not
at some subsequent point in time, e.g., the present. In contrast to the
faithful agent view, however, textualism adopts an "objective" rather
than a "subjective" theory of meaning. That is, it does not try to
determine what a majority of the enacting legislature would have
decided had it attended specifically to the question at issue; instead, it
asks what the ordinary reader of the statute would have understood the
words to mean at the time of the enactment.148
Because Justice Scalia's textualism makes the objective meaning to
the ordinary historical reader key, different types of legal authority are
146. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 623
(1990); William D. Popkin, An "Internal" Critique of Jwtice Scalia's Theory of Statutory
Interpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133 (1992).
147. See Eskridge, supra note 146; Patricia M. Wald, The Siu.ling Sleeper: The Use
of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United States
Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV, 277 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, Justice Scalia's
Textualism: The "New" New Legal Process, 12 CARDOZO L. REv. 1597, 1597-98 (1991).
148. See OmCB OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USING AND MISUSING
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A REEVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 20-26 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 61 (1994).
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deemed to be relevant than those consulted by the faithful agent. Most
importantly, all forms of legislative history are out of bounds, in part
because of the danger of manipulation (also acknowledged by faithful
agent interpreters), 149 but more fundamentally because these materials
are relevant to determining the subjective intentions of the enacting
legislators, rather than the objective meaning of the statute.1 50 In
contrast, other interpretative aids, such as contemporary dictionaries and
usage reflected in other contemporary statutes, may be freely consulted.
In addition, Justice Scalia makes frequent use of Whole Act ruleexamining the structure of the statute and the language of other
provisions-in order to glean clues to the meaning of the challenged
provision.15 1 Finally, when confronted with a question that cannot be
answered by dictionary definitions or an examination of other statutory
provisions, he will generally tum to canons of construction in order to
supply an answer to a disputed issue of statutory interpretation.152
My point in raising Justice Scalia's textualism is not to debate the
relative merits of the faithful agent approach and the textualist
method. 153 Instead, the question I would like to ask is this: if faithful
149. See, e.g., Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 67 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment); Hirschey v. Federal Employees Retirement Comm'n, 777
F.2d 1, 7-8 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring).
150. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 29 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia has recognized a narrow
exception to his proscription against use of legislative history. In cases where it is
alleged that the plain meaning of the statute generates an absurd result, legislative history
may be consulted in order to confirm that the absurd meaning was not intended. Green v.
Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia has also freely consulted extra-textual historical materials in constitutional cases,
an anomaly noted by several commentators. See, e.g., Note, Justice Scalia's Use of
Sources in Statutory and Constitutional Interpretation: How Congress Always Loses,
1990 DUKE L.J. 160.
151. See, e.g., Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
152. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. _, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2060 (1993)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 404 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
153. I agree with much of Justice Stephen Breyer's recent critical analysis of
textualism as a method for resolving questions involving ambiguities or gaps in statutes.
See Stephen Breyer, On The Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992). A more serious question is whether these advantages are worth
the additional administrative costs entailed by requiring parties and courts to consult
legislative history, given that in a high percentage of cases the legislative history is
uninformative or misleading.
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agent interpretation can be seen as a byproduct of an ultrapluralist theory
of government, then what theory of government supports textualism?
One possibility is that textualism corresponds to no particular theory
of government. To borrow a distinction made by Dan Farber, 154 some
judges may be "foundationalists" who believe that "normative
conclusions can be deduced from a single unifying value or
principle."155 Other judges may be "formalists" who adhere to the
view that "the proper decision in a case can be deduced from a
preexisting set of rules." 156 On my account, Chief Justice Rehnquist
would be regarded as a foundationalist: his decisions, both in
constitutional and statutory cases, can be explained by a commitment to
what I have called an ultrapluralist theory of government. Justice Scalia,
in contrast, could simply be a formalist judge. In particular, his textualist
theory of statutory interpretation could be grounded in nothing more
profound than a belief that one of the rules of judging is to interpret
statutes according to the objective meaning for the ordinary reader,
rather than the subjective desires of the enacting legislators.157
This explanation is not very satisfactory, however. For one thing,
textualism is not the conventional "rule" for statutory interpretation, at
least in this century . 158 Thus, textualism cannot be justified simply on
the ground that ''that's the way it is." For another, Justice Scalia himself
attributes great normative significance to the battle between textualism
and intentionalism, suggesting that the Constitution compels
textualism l59 and that the use of legislative history will lead to
manipulation of courts by legislative insiders. 160 Finally, Justice Scalia
himself uses historical sources on occasion, i.e., in interpreting the
154. Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism,
45 VAND. L. REv. 533,539 (1992).

and the Rule of Law,
155. Id.
156. Id.

15 7. Justice Scalia sets forth his case for a jurisprudence of rules in Antonin Scalia.
The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989).
158. See Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 610-12 n.4 (1991);
Maltz, supra note 135; William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study
of Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799 (1985); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
159. See, e.g., Conroy v. Aniskoff, _ U.S. _, 113 S. Ct. 1562, 1567 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 188 (1988)

(Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
160. Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia. J., concurring in part
and concurring in judgment).
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Constitution, 161 and thus we need some explanation of why textualism
is uniquely inappropriate in routine statutory interpretation cases.
When we start to look for a foundationalist theory of the political
process that would sustain textualism, two very different possibilities
present themselves. One is that Justice Scalia' s te.xtualism reflects an
implicit political theory that is in many ways the exact opposite of
Justice Rehnquist' s pluralism: a theory that posits that legislative
judgments reflect an imminent rationality-a single coherent truth about
the nature of mankind and the proper ordering of human relationships.
As Nicholas Zeppos has pointed out, many of the interpretative
techniques relied upon most extensively by Justice Scalia presuppose "a
rational or omniscient legislature,"162 rather than a legislature of ad hoc
bargains. Included here would be the assumptions that Congress is a
perfect grammarian, l63 that different provisions of a statute reflect a
single, unified structure, 164 that words are used the same way in
different statutes, l65 and that Congress is familiar with all provisions in
the United States Code.166
Other aspects of Justice Scalia's jurisprudence lend further credence
to the hypothesis that he believes in a imminent rational order. In
addition to his advocacy of textualism in statutory interpretation, Justice
Scalia in recent years has begun to champion the use of tradition as a
tool for giving meaning to open-ended clauses of the Constitution, such
as the Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. 167 With respect
to procedural due process, for example, Justice Scalia has authored
opinions upholding transitory personal jurisdiction168 and standardless

161. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 849
(1989).
162. Nicholas S. Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes:
Toward a Fact-finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 16 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1320
(1990).
163. Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. _, 113 S. Ct. 1085 (1993); Crandon v. United
States, 494 U.S. 152, 168 (1990) (Scalia. J., concurring).
164. Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988).
165. Morales v. TWA, Inc., 504 U.S. _, 112 S. Ct. 2031 (1992); Pierce v.
Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
166. West Virginia Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
167. See generally David A. Strauss, Tradition, Precedent, and Justice Scalia, 12
CARDOZO L. REV. 1699 (1991).
168. Burnham v. Superior Court. 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (plurality opinion).
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jury instructions on punitive damages 169 because both have been
sanctioned by longstanding historical practice. With respect to
substantive due process, he has argued that fundamental rights should
be identified by a narrow inquiry into traditional practice, as reflected for
example, in state laws.1 70 He recently extended this methodology into
the First Amendment area, arguing in Burson v. Freeman 111 that the
identification of a public forum should be governed by an historical
inquiry into tradition.
Taken together, Justice Scalia's textualism and his traditionalism
could reflect a more general rationalist theory of politics. Under this
theory, the authoritative pronouncements of society-its binding texts
' and established traditions-would all be seen as reflecting a single,
imminent, coherent truth about the proper ordering of human society
and human affairs. I am not quite sure what to call this implicit
philosophy, perhaps a Burkean or, better yet, Acquinian theory of the
political order, on the assumption that such a rationalist theory may be
related at some level to Justice Scalia's Roman Catholic upbringing and
education. 172 In any event, the idea would be that if we engage in a
sustained study of the authoritative texts of the legal order-the laws
and traditions of our people-we will discover a single, rational set of
rules by which we must be govemed.173
Although the possibility that Justice Scalia is an Acquinian
rationalist is intriguing, there is another very different hypothesis that
could also account for his textualism. This is the hypothesis that Justice
Scalia is also a pluralist, but unlike Chief Justice Rehnquist, he harbors a
pessimistic rather than an optimistic assessment of the capacity of
democratic institutions to engage in an accurate summing of private
interests. In other words~ like the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia is dubious
about the possibility of calling upon federal courts to enforce an
169. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. l, 24 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment).
170. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality opinion); Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
171. 504 U.S._, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1859 (1992).
L.J.

172. See George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE
1297 (1990).
173. The posited rationalist theory would also account for Justice Scalia's relative

indifference to federalism values (compared to Chief Justice Rehnquist). If one believes in
an imminent rational order, then politics reflects a single reality, not diverse conceptions
of the good. Hence, there is little point in permitting decentralized decisionmaking.
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objective understanding of the common good. But unlike the Chief
Justice, he believes that the summing of private interests by democratic
institutions is also more than likely defective. A multiply-negative
pluralist of this variety could be driven to textualism, the theory would
continue, because textualism promises to frustrate rather than advance
the defective pluralist outcomes of the legislative branch, and yet it does
so in a way that does not require that federal courts understand and
implement any comprehensive theory of the common good.
The way in which a multiply-negative pluralist political theory could
lead to textualism is illustrated by the jurisprudence of Judge Frank
Easterbrook. Judge Easterbrook is an especially significant figure here
because, like Justice Scalia, he is a prominent proponent of textualism.
Unlike Justice Scalia, however, he has written extensively on public
choice theory and its implications for the judicial role. In fact, we know
from Judge Easterbrook's pre-judicial writings that (a) he holds a
pessimistic view of the capacities of democratic legislatures to engage in
accurate interest summing; 174 (b) he believes that courts are subject to
the same pluralist forces that affect democratic institutions; 175 and (c) he
takes a strongly moral skeptical view of questions of social policy, at
least outside the area of economic policy. 176 His first effort to define a
judicial role in the face of these commitments was an article called
Statutes' Domains,111 where he argued in favor of a kind of universal
clear statement rule: if the proponent of a statutory entitlement could not
point to language expressly conferring the entitlement, the court would
simply declare the statute inapplicable. As Easterbrook made clear, the
rule of limited statutes' domains was designed to increase the costs of
legislative rent seeking, by requiring interest groups to get the deal in
writing before courts would enforce it.
Shortly after assuming the bench, Judge Easterbrook softened his
approach to statutory interpretation, and announced his conversion to
textualism. 17 8 The inference that may be drawn from this is that for
Easterbrook, textualism serves as a modified version of the rule of
174. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984).
17 5. Easterbrook, supra note 19.
176. Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. er. REV. 85,
110-11.
177. Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, supra note 67.
178. See, e.g., ln re Sinclair, 870 F.2d 1340 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Erickson, 815
F.2d 1090 (7th Cir. 1987).
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statutes' domains. Like the rule of statutes' domains, it forces interest
groups to obtain explicit language codifying any bargains they have
secured if they are to be confident of receiving the benefits. 179 Unlike
the theory of statutes' domains, the consequences of failing to obtain
explicit language under textualism is not that the court will simply
declare no law applicable; instead, the consequence is randomness: the
court will apply "a relatively unimaginative, mechanical process of
interpretation" 180 to reach a result that may or may not coincide with the
legislative purpose. Although textualism is weaker medicine for a
dysfunctional legislative process than is the rule of statutes' domains, it
has the virtue of appearing less activist, and of comporting more closely
with established legal traditions.
There is some evidence that would suggest Justice Scalia' s
commitment to textualism is driven more by Easterbrookian public
choice theory than by Acquinian rationalism. His dismissive contempt
for legislative history, for example, seems to be motivated in large part
by the view that the legislative process is characterized by manipulation
and deceit.1 81 Additionally, his tenure as an editor of Regulation
magazine would suggest that he is sympathetic to economic ordering,
and familiar with economic and public choice arguments about
legislative failure. 182 Finally, his commitment to greater protection of
economic rights, especially under the Takings Clause, 183 suggests that

17 9. See Easterbrook, supra note 148:
A fourth thing we wish to do is to constrain Congress .... Congress must act
bicamerally. It needs presidential approval. The laws must be published. These
requirements serve important values-they cut down on the amount of legislation
and drive bargains into the open where they may be scrutinized. Enacting a
vaporous statute and winking, or putting some stuff in the reports, avoids these
constraints-which judges can resist by insisting that words in laws be taken
seriously.
Id. at 63-64.
180. Id. at 67.
181. See supra note 149.
182. Justice Scalia has written, for example, that he believes in the importance of
economic rights, and would if a legislator vote for fewer restrictions on economic
freedoms. But he has counseled against a revival of strong judicial protection of economic
rights under the Due Process Clause because he believes this would encourage judicial
activism in other areas, and because courts cannot be trusted to make correct economic
judgments. Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, 4 CATO J. 703 (1985).
183. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S._, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 334 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
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he is pessimistic about the capacity of local legislatures to sum
competing private interests. To be sure, this evidence is circumstantial.
The possibility remains that Justice Scalia is ambivalent about the nature
of the political system, or has no fixed views on the subject. But there is
some reason to believe that he is not a rationalist but pluralist with an
especially dark vision of the relevant options.
VIl. CONCLUSION

Chief Justice Rehnquist is an unusual figure in the annals of
American law. Commentators from the academy and the media are
forever insisting that we need a Chief Justice with a coherent vision. The
current Chief Justice has such a vision, but the commentators have
trouble seeing it. The problem, of course, is that Chief Justice
Rehnquist' s theory of politics-ultrapluralism-is not the vision the
commentators have in mind. From the perspective of the critics on the
left, Chief Justice Rehnquist is a curious mixture of activism and
restraint: activist in pursuit of States' rights, restrained in cases of
individual rights. His statutory interpretation opinions seem to have no
unifying theme at all. However, once we recognize that Chief Justice
Rehnquist is an optimist about democratic institutions, pessimistic about
courts, and a thoroughgoing skeptic about claims to objective
knowledge of the common good, much of his work as a jurist falls into
place. It turns out that Chief Justice Rehnquist is every bit as much a
visionary as Chief Justice Marshall or Chief Justice Warren.
Although Chief Justice Rehnquist cannot be faulted for lacking a
vision, his problems in translating that vision into reality go beyond lack
of support outside the Court. If I am correct in my speculations about
the wellsprings of Justice Scalia's textualism, it would appear that the
majority of conservative Justices now serving on the Court are working
at cross purposes with each other. The institutional leader of the
conservative group-its Chief Justice-acts on the basis of a pluralist
theory that would have courts act as faithful agents to effectuate the
decisions made by democratically accountable decisionmakers. The
intellectual leader of the group, Justice Scalia, acts on the basis of an
approach that works to frustrate the designs of the legislative branch, by
interpreting its commands in accordance with a wooden textualism.
concurring); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
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How this underlying tension will be resolved, or if it will ever be
resolved, very much remains to be seen. At least as things presently
stand, however, the discordance between Chief Justice Rehnquist's
ultrapluralism and Justice Scalia's very different approach to law makes
it highly doubtful that the Rehnquist Court will ever establish a legacy to
rival that associated with the names Marshall and Warren.

